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1Abstract
Individuals extracting common-pool resources in the ﬁeld sometimes form output-
sharing groups to avoid costs of crowding. In theory, if the right number of groups
forms, Nash equilibrium aggregate eﬀort should fall to the socially optimal level.
Whether individuals manage to form the eﬃcient number of groups and to invest
within the chosen groups as theory predicts, however, has not been previously deter-
mined. We investigate these questions experimentally. We ﬁnd that subjects do vote
in most cases to divide themselves into the optimal number of output-sharing groups,
and in addition do decrease the ineﬃciency signiﬁcantly (by 50% to 71%). We did
observe systematic departures from the theory when the group sizes are not predicted
to induce socially optimal investment. Without exception these are in the direction
of the socially optimal investment, conﬁrming the tendency noted elsewhere in public
goods experiments for subjects to be more “other-regarding” than purely selﬁsh.
Keywords: Catch-Sharing, Common-Pool Resources, Eﬃcient Private Provision, Free-
Riding, Laboratory Experiment, Partnership Solution
JEL Classiﬁcation: L23, Q20, Q22, O13
21 Introduction
The common-property problem results in excessive mining, hunting, and extraction of oil
and water. The same phenomenon is also responsible for excessive investment in research
and excessive outlays in rent-seeking contests. As the collective work of Nobel Laureate
Elinor Ostrom extensively documents, however, humans sometimes ﬁnd creative solutions to
eliminate or mitigate the ubiquitous common-property problem (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom and
Walker 1991; Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994; Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010). One
such mechanism is output-sharing (Schott, 2001; Heintzelman, Salant, Schott 2009). This
paper investigates in a controlled laboratory setting whether agents, given an opportunity
to choose the size of their output-sharing groups, can eliminate or at least attenuate the
common-property problem.
Heintzelman et al. (2009) have recently analyzed the consequences of output sharing
in an environment with negative externalities and unobservable eﬀort. They consider a
game where N self-interested members of output-sharing groups simultaneously choose their
ﬁshing eﬀorts. Every individual is assumed to pay his or her own eﬀort cost, since eﬀort
is unobservable. The polar case where every partnership contains a single individual (N
such partnerships in all) corresponds to the standard formulation of the common-property
problem and is well known to result in excessive aggregate eﬀort. As the N players are
partitioned into fewer but larger partnerships, aggregate eﬀort in the Nash equilibrium falls
monotonically until the other polar extreme is reached where all N players are grouped into
one grand output-sharing partnership. However, aggregate eﬀort in that conﬁguration is
below the social optimum.1 To maximize social surplus and eliminate the common-property
problem requires an intermediate number of groups. Heintzelman et al. (2009) refer to the
1Although every player receives 1/N th of the marginal social beneﬁt of increasing his
eﬀort one unit, he incurs the entire marginal social cost of his increased eﬀort, and hence he
would have an incentive to reduce his eﬀort below 1/N th of the socially optimal level.
3partnership structure maximizing social surplus as the “Partnership Solution.” Note that
the Partnership Solution is a self-enforcing mechanism that requires neither monitoring of
individual behavior nor intervention of the government.
Some societies seem to have hit upon this solution long ago. In Japanese ﬁsheries, ﬁsh-
ermen within a group of vessels share their catches. Their pooled output is sold through a
common outlet, and each group member receives an equal share of his partnership’s gross
revenue, no matter how little eﬀort he has expended. One hundred forty-seven Japanese
ﬁsheries engage in output sharing in spite of—or because of—the free riding involved. Plat-
teau and Seki (2000) interviewed skippers in one such ﬁshery, the glass-shrimp industry, to
determine their motivation. The researchers were surprised to ﬁnd that the ﬁshermen never
mentioned ensuring against low catches as one of the motivations for forming output-sharing
partnerships. Instead, Platteau and Seki concluded that “the desire to avoid the various
costs of crowding while operating in attractive ﬁshing spots appears as the main reason
stated by Japanese ﬁshermen for adopting pooling arrangements.”
These Japanese ﬁshermen appear to have rediscovered an ancient solution to the common-
property problem. According to anthropologists, those hunter-gatherer cultures that have
survived to modern times may owe their success to their practice of sharing the ﬁsh and
game caught by groups of hunters, since extensive sharing dulls hunting eﬀort suﬃciently to
protect common property from overexploitation (Kagi 2001; Sahlins 1972).
At the opposite end of the technological spectrum, individuals who form research joint
ventures to share revenue from their discoveries may have hit upon the same solution. When
an increase in aggregate research activity would raise the expected value of the best innova-
tion, competition among individuals to discover and patent the best innovation will result
in too much research (Baye and Hoppe 2003) and forming competing research joint ventures
can restore the social optimum (Heintelzman et al. 2009).
Schott et al. (2007) were the ﬁrst to examine output sharing experimentally by ex-
4ogenously dividing subjects into equal-size groups. They demonstrated that exogenous
variations in group size aﬀect subsequent behavior as predicted and that the appropriate
exogenous group size results in socially optimal behavior.
We build on their work by addressing several important questions that they were unable to
explore in their pioneering study. We investigate whether, given the opportunity, individuals
will choose to form output-sharing groups of equal size instead of everyone remaining solo.2
In addition, we investigate whether the output-sharing groups that subjects choose motivate
them to invest more eﬃciently than they would when operating solo. To do this, we conduct
a laboratory experiment where subjects vote on the size of their output-sharing groups and
then play an investment game in the chosen group structure. Finally, we also explore whether
individuals choose the eﬃcient group sizes and invest optimal amounts under diﬀerent costs of
investment. In theory, subjects should vote to form smaller groups when investment becomes
more costly. Establishing how players partition themselves endogenously is important, since
in the ﬁeld subjects will choose how many groups to form. If players turned out always to
vote for a suboptimal number of partnerships, then our laboratory society would never solve
the common-property problem even if, as in Schott et al. (2007), it made socially optimal
choices when the optimal partnership structure was exogenously mandated.
In our experiment, subjects were divided (exogenously or endogenously) into groups of
equal size and played the following investment game. Each subject had to decide how to
allocate his or her tokens between two projects. Project A had a return per token invested
that was independent of the amount invested. Project B had a higher return per token for the
ﬁrst token invested, but the return decreased linearly with the aggregate investment. Hence,
2To our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to investigate endogenous output-sharing groups
in the setting of a common-pool resource. Whether and how individuals form groups is known
to be an important issue in public goods environments (Page, Putterman and Unel 2005;
Ahn, Isaac and Salmon 2008, 2009; Charness and Yang 2008; Brekke, Hauge, Lind and
Nyborg 2009).
5a person’s return per token invested in Project B was adversely aﬀected if others invested
more in the same project—the essence of the common-property problem. Every member
of a given partnership received an equal share of his or her group’s return from Project B
regardless of his or her own investment in that project. Because investing an additional token
in Project B meant that the subject could not use that token to earn the constant return
available from Project A, each subject bore his or her own opportunity cost of additional
investment in Project B. Our experimental design varies both this opportunity cost and the
size of the partnerships. Since partnerships with a single member (solo partnerships) were
included, one of our treatments is the standard commons case where there is no output
sharing among individuals.
In our experiments, individuals grouped into solo partnerships did overinvest in Project
B, to their collective detriment. But as the group size increased, subjects invested smaller
amounts in Project B and, as a result, obtained higher payoﬀs as theory predicts. When
given the opportunity to choose the size of their partnerships, most of the subjects voted for
the group size that maximized the joint payoﬀ (which is socially optimal), and subjects cut
the waste associated with the common-property problem on average by at least two-thirds
in three of the cost treatments and by one-half in the remaining cost treatment. When we
varied the opportunity cost of investing in Project B (the return from Project A), subjects
tended to vote for the group size that became socially optimal given the new circumstance.
However, systematic departures from the theory were also noted. When the exogenous
number of groups is predicted to yield socially optimal aggregate investment, there is no
statistically signiﬁcant departure from the theoretical prediction. However, when the number
of groups is predicted to yield aggregate investment that is either below or above the social
optimum, there are statistically signiﬁcant departures from the theoretical predictions, and
without exception they are in the direction of the socially optimal investment. Hence, as
elsewhere in the literature, we ﬁnd that laboratory behavior is more “cooperative” and
“other-regarding” than a theory based on self-interested behavior would predict (i.e., Ostrom
6et. al. 1992; Ostrom et al. 1994; Ledyard 1995; Camerer 2003; Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher
2005).
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes our experimental design and proce-
dures. Section 3 presents our theoretical hypotheses. Section 4 reports our experimental
ﬁndings and the results of our hypothesis tests. Section 5 discusses directions for future
research and concludes the paper.
2 Experimental Design and Procedures
We conducted 25 sessions, each with a diﬀerent set of 6 participants. Most participants
were undergraduates at University of Michigan. Subjects earned experimental currency
(tokens), which was converted at the conclusion of the session into US dollars (1 token =
0.01 US dollars). The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). Sessions took approximately one hour and a half.
Each session was divided into six separate parts. Each of the ﬁrst ﬁve parts (Parts I–V)
consisted of a sequence of 5 rounds of decision making. Therefore, each subject went through
25 rounds in total. One aim of the ﬁrst four parts was to give subjects experience investing
as members of groups of diﬀerent sizes. In Part V of the experiment, subjects chose the
size of the groups endogenously. In Part VI, subjects completed a short questionnaire. At
the end of the experiment, we randomly selected one round from each of the ﬁrst ﬁve parts,
added up the tokens each subject had earned in the selected rounds, converted that sum
to dollars, added in the $5 show-up fee, and paid everyone. The average payment in the
experiment was approximately $25 per subject.
In the ﬁrst four parts, subjects were exogenously divided into groups of identical size:
one-member groups, two-member groups, three-member groups, or a six-member group.
Subjects were randomly rematched across groups in every round but played 5 consecutive
7rounds in each group size in order to gain experience. In total, there were 20 rounds in the
ﬁrst four parts. In order to control for order eﬀects, the order of the ﬁrst four parts was
changed across sessions.
At the beginning of each decision round in the ﬁrst four parts, participants were given 6
experimental tokens and had to decide how many of them (0,1,...,6) to invest in Project
B. Whatever a subject did not invest in Project B was automatically invested in Project
A. Denote xik as the investment in Project B by agent k in group i.L e tY
−k
i denote the
aggregate investment in Project B by the other members of group i, X−i denote the aggregate
investment in Project B by other groups, and X denote the total investment in Project B
by all 6 participants.
Project A had a ﬁxed return of c tokens per token invested; i.e., the subject’s earnings
from Project A equaled c times his investment in Project A. Therefore, the “opportunity
cost” of investing one additional token in Project B equaled c, the lost earnings from Project
A.
The return per token invested in Project B, A(X), was a decreasing linear function of the
aggregate investment in Project B; i.e., Project B represented the common-pool resource.
For each token invested in Project B, the return from Project B was given by
A(X)=2 0 0− 5X.
An individual’s earnings from Project B (Eik) depended on the participant’s group in-




(200 − 5X)(xik + Y
−k
i ).
Final earnings in each round (in tokens) were simply the sum of earnings from Project
8A and earnings from Project B:
πik =( 6− xik)c +
1
m
(200 − 5X)(xik + Y
−k
i ).
It can be seen that each individual pays the cost of his or her investment but shares the
revenue equally with the members of his group. In each of the ﬁve rounds of Part V, subjects
ﬁrst voted for one of the four group sizes. Then, subjects were divided up in groups of the
size that won the most votes and played the investment game.3
In our experimental design, diﬀerent group sizes are socially optimal under diﬀerent
treatments. In particular, as the opportunity cost of investing in Project B increases, the
optimal group size decreases. Subjects in a given experimental session faced only one cost
parameter and had to make investment decisions in all ﬁve parts of the experiment (25
rounds). A summary of the experimental design is provided in Table 1. As Table 1 reﬂects,
the socially optimal group size is diﬀerent for each treatment. For example, for opportunity
cost c =2 0 , the optimal size of each group is 3 members (or, equivalently, the optimal
number of groups is 2).










1  6  Exogenous  Voting  5  30 
20  3  Exogenous  Voting  5  30 
55  2  Exogenous  Voting  5  30 
100  1  Exogenous  Voting  5  30 

Prior to the experiment, a test was administered to the subjects to make sure they
understood the payoﬀ consequences of their choices. The computer prevented anyone from
3In cases of a tied vote, the winner was chosen at random.
9beginning the session until everyone had a perfect score on the test.
During the experiment, subjects could either calculate their payoﬀs by hand or could
utilize a “Situation Analyzer” provided to facilitate their calculations. A subject could enter
his or her conjecture about (1) the total investment in Project B by others inside his or
her group and (2) the total investment in Project B by subjects outside his or her group.
The Situation Analyzer would then provide a table listing in one row the seven choices for
investing in Project B (0,1,...,6 tokens) and in the other row the total payoﬀ from the two
projects that the subject would earn if his or her two conjectures were accurate. Subjects
were free to do such calculations by hand or to use the Situation Analyzer as often as they
wanted before making a decision. The Situation Analyzer is shown in Figure 1.
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To help subjects to make a decision, subjects were also reminded of their own investments,
others’ investments in their group, and the total investment, as well as their earnings from
previous rounds.
After the session, we administered a short questionnaire. We asked subjects the basis
of their investment decisions and the basis of their vote on group size. Responses clearly
showed that subjects understood the experiment. Most of the subjects reported that they
tried to maximize their monetary earnings.
103 Theoretical Predictions and Hypotheses
Theoretical predictions are based on Heintzelman et al. (2009). Each individual chooses his
or her investment level to maximize his or her own payoﬀ given the investments of other
individuals. Proposition 1 summarizes the Nash equilibrium investments.
Proposition 1. For a given opportunity cost (c) and equal-size groups of size m, mean
investment in Project B is ¯ x = 200−cm
30+5m .4
On the other hand, socially optimal investment of the 36 tokens, X∗, maximizes revenue
from the two projects: XA(X)+( 3 6− X)c. Proposition 2 provides the socially eﬃcient
investment.
Proposition 2. To maximize social surplus, mean investment in Project B must be x∗ =
200−c
60 .
When group size is one (no output sharing), it is easy to see that in equilibrium there
is overinvestment in Project B relative to the socially optimal level. However, as the group
size increases, theoretically predicted investment level decreases. In fact, for each cost pa-
rameter, it is possible to ﬁnd a group size that approximately generates the socially optimal
investment in Project B. The optimal group size m∗, partnership solution, is the group size
that (approximately) equates ¯ x to x∗. In general, we expect partnership solution to increase
eﬃciency close to the socially optimal levels, if not to the same level.
In Table 2, we show the predicted levels of mean investment in Project B corresponding
to each group size for each level of the opportunity cost of investing in Project B.5 For any
4Total investment is uniquely determined in the equilibrium. However, there are multiple
equilibria. Therefore, we focus on the mean investment level. See Heintzelman et al. (2009)
for more details.
5In this experiment, subjects faced a discrete action space. Though the theoretical predic-
11opportunity cost (c), Nash equilibrium investment in Project B decreases with the size of
each group. Moreover, investment in that project decreases with the opportunity cost for
any group size. Socially optimal outcomes (partnership solutions for each cost parameter)
are shown in bold.
Table 2: Theoretically Predicted Levels of Investment 
Group size  Cost = 1  Cost = 20  Cost = 55  Cost = 100 
1  5.69  5.14  4.14  2.86 
2  4.95  4  2.25  0 
3  4.38  3.11  0.78  0 











We test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. For a given opportunity cost (c) of investing in Project B, mean investment
in that project strictly decreases with the size of the groups.
Hypothesis 2. Mean investment in Project B decreases with the opportunity cost of
investing in that project for a given group size.
tions were generated from a game with continuous actions, the assumption of discrete actions
does not change the predictions. More speciﬁcally, suppose agents choose a noninteger in-
vestment level x for Project B in the symmetric equilibrium of the continuous investment
game. Then, in the discrete version, there is an equilibrium in which every player chooses
the integer above x or below x, or mixes between the two. Furthermore, because the total
payoﬀ function is quadratic in investment, ﬁrst-order changes in the investment in Project
B induce only second-order changes in payoﬀs. In other words, players receive a payoﬀ in
the discrete case that is very close to that of the continuous case. Since both the actions
and the payoﬀs of the two cases are very similar, the game played in our experiment very
accurately captures the continuous-action game.
12Hypothesis 3. In Part V, subjects should vote to establish groups of the socially eﬃcient
size.6
The experimental data and ﬁndings are presented in the next section.
4 Data Analysis
4.1 Exogenous Groups and Investment Decisions
Figure 2 shows the average investment corresponding to each opportunity cost parameter in
the ﬁrst 20 rounds (Parts I–IV). For simplicity, group sizes are presented in the following or-
der: one-member, two-member, three-member, and six-member groups, although orders were
randomized during the sessions.7 Consistent with the theoretical predictions, contributions
decrease with the group size for any cost level.
Theoretical predictions and the observed mean levels of investment in Project B are
provided in Table 3. Theory predicts that the socially optimal group size decreases with
cost. Observed mean investment and predicted investment in Project B are shaded for the
theoretically optimal group sizes. Observed mean investment at the optimal group size for
each cost is surprisingly close to the theoretical predictions and the socially optimal level of
6As is well known, this voting game has multiple Nash equilibria. For example, a unan-
imous vote for any alternative is a Nash equilibrium, since no voter is “pivotal.” To avoid
such problems, we piloted a second voting mechanism which has a unique Nash equilibrium:
after each subject had voted for his or her preferred outcome, one of the six subjects was cho-
sen to be “dictator,” and his or her vote determined the partnership structure. Since every
subject had a positive probability of being chosen dictator, each subject should have been
motivated to vote for his or her most preferred alternative. We were unable to distinguish
behavior under the two voting schemes and therefore used the more familiar nondictatorial
scheme for this paper.
7We do not observe any order eﬀects in our data.






















































































































































































We performed some nonparametric tests by using independent observations (one data
point per session). One-sided sign tests conﬁrm that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between the observed levels of investment and the theoretical predictions at the optimal
group sizes (p-values are greater than 0.1). For nonoptimal group sizes, point predictions
do not hold in general (p-values are generally less than 0.05).8 However, all deviations are
toward the socially optimal level.
8The two exceptions are when cost is 20 and group size is six and when cost is 55 and
group size is one. In these cases, investments are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than the predicted
levels.
14Table 3: Predicted versus Observed Mean Investment
 c   =   1   c   =   2 0   c   =   5 5   c   =   1 0 0  
Group 
size 
Predicted  Observed  Predicted  Observed  Predicted  Observed  Predicted  Observed 
1  5.69  5.02 
(1.36) 
5.14  4.69 
(1.55) 
4.14  3.89 
(1.50) 
2.86  2.93 
(1.70) 
2  4.95  4.47 
(1.41) 
4  3.55 
(1.54) 
2.25  2.34 
(1.68) 
0  1.26 
(1.38) 
3  4.38  3.98 
(1.55) 
3.11  3.02 
(1.56) 
0.78  1.42 
(1.35) 
0  1.17 
(1.46) 
6  3.23  3.13 
(1.85) 
1.33  1.89 
(1.59) 
0  1.15 
(1.47) 
0  0.81 
(1.12) 
  Socially efficient 
investment  = 3.32 
Socially efficient 
investment  = 3
Socially efficient 
investment  = 2.42
Socially efficient 
investment  = 1.67
Standard deviations are in parentheses 
Number of observations = 150 per cell 

Result 1: Theoretical predictions hold at the optimal group sizes. However, there are devia-
tions from quantitative predictions for other group sizes. When data are not consistent with
the predicted levels, deviations are in the direction of socially optimal level in all cases.
Table 4 shows the observed mean payoﬀ for each cost and group size. For cost levels
c = {1,20,55} theoretically predicted optimal group size generates the highest level of payoﬀ.
Note that for c = 100 theoretically predicted optimal group size is 1 (no output sharing).
However, for c = 100, higher levels of payoﬀ are achieved with group sizes more than 1. One
possible explanation is that, as Table 3 shows, theoretically predicted level of investment
is not very close to the socially eﬃcient level (since it is not possible to divide individuals
into noninteger group sizes). Even though the mean investment with solo groups is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than predicted, the deviations we observe in the other group sizes
aﬀect the payoﬀs in an unpredicted way.9
For cost levels c = {1,20,55}, we test whether the Partnership Solution improves the
9For group sizes greater than 1, complete free riding is not observed as predicted. This
is consistent with behavior observed in public goods experiments. It has been documented
that subjects do not free ride completely (see Ledyard 1995).
15Table 4: Predicted versus Observed Mean Payoﬀ



















1  168  241 
(88.03) 
252  295 
(90.61) 
416  427 
(75.65) 
640  625 
(61.61) 
2  256  286 
(75.70) 
360  370 
(67.48) 
504  497 
(101.21) 
600  670 
(109.19) 
3  302  314 
(58.25) 
390  377 
(64.86) 
425  465 
(85.11) 
600  671 
(132.10) 
6  336  323 
(22.34) 
307  341 
(48.99) 
330  443 
(88.00) 
600  656 
(105.90) 
  Socially efficient 
payoff  = 336 
Socially efficient 
payoff  = 390
Socially efficient 
payoff  = 505
Socially efficient 
payoff  = 683
Standard deviations are in parentheses 
Number of observations = 150 per cell 

payoﬀ of participants relative to the case where there is no output sharing (being solo). By
using matched-pair sign-rank tests, we conﬁrm that the Partnership Solution increases the
payoﬀs. In particular, we compare the mean payoﬀ levels at the socially optimal group size
with the mean payoﬀ levels at the group size of one. Each individual’s payoﬀ increases with
the Partnership Solution and the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
For c = 100, the group size of 1 brings the lowest payoﬀ, even though it was the theo-
retically optimal group size (p-values for all pairwise comparisons are 0.04). Output sharing
seems to help individuals even in situations where theoretically it is not the case.
Result 2: Output sharing improves payoﬀs when groups are exogenously formed.
We complement nonparametric tests with a regression analysis. We investigate the impact
of diﬀerent group sizes, costs, the order of presenting group sizes, and rounds on individual
investment decisions by running ordinary least squares estimation with robust standard
errors (see Table 5).10
10Data are clustered by 20 sessions.









Investment B  1  2  3  4 
    
groupsize  –0.42**  –0.42**  –0.43**   
 ( 0 . 0 2 )   ( 0 . 0 2 )   ( 0 . 0 2 )    
cost  –0.03**  –0.03**  –0.03**   
 ( 0 . 0 0 )   ( 0 . 0 0 )   ( 0 . 0 0 )    
round    0.00  0.00   
   ( 0 . 0 2 )   ( 0 . 0 2 )    
grsize2        –1.23** 
       ( 0 . 1 2 )  
grsize3        –1.74** 
       ( 0 . 1 4 )  
grsize6        –2.39** 
       ( 0 . 1 3 )  
cost20        –0.86** 
       ( 0 . 1 2 )  
cost55        –1.95** 
       ( 0 . 1 1 )  
cost100        –2.61** 
       ( 0 . 0 9 )  
round2        0.04 
       ( 0 . 1 0 )  
round3        –0.03 
       ( 0 . 0 9 )  
round4        0.09 
       ( 0 . 1 0 )  
round5        –0.00 
       ( 0 . 1 0 )  
phase2      –0.10  –0.00 
     ( 0 . 1 7 )   ( 0 . 1 0 )  
phase3      –0.01  0.08 
     ( 0 . 1 8 )   ( 0 . 1 2 )  
phase4      –0.08  0.02 
     ( 0 . 2 3 )   ( 0 . 1 4 )  
        
Constant  5.20**  5.19**  5.25**  5.45** 
 ( 0 . 1 0 )   ( 0 . 0 9 )   ( 0 . 1 6 )   ( 0 . 1 6 )  
        
Observations  2,400  2,400  2,400  2,400 
R-squared  0.384  0.384  0.384  0.431 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
17Regression results (speciﬁcation 1) show that for a given cost level, an increase in the
group size decreases the level of investment in Project B. We also see that there is a negative
relationship between the level of investment and the opportunity cost parameter, c. Speciﬁ-
cations 2–4 show that these results continue to hold even when we add control variables or
when we include the diﬀerent treatments as dummy variables.11 In addition, we see that the
order of treatments and experience do not aﬀect investment decisions.12 In summary, one
cannot reject hypotheses 1 and 2. Our results are robust to diﬀerent estimation methods.13
Result 3: The data are consistent with the (qualitative) theoretical predictions. For each
cost level, investment decreases with group size. Moreover, investment decreases with cost
for a given group size.
4.2 Voting for Group Size: The Plurality Rule
Table 6 presents the percentage of votes that each group size received for each cost level.
There are 150 observations for a given level of cost and group size. Except for c =1 0 0 ,
groups frequently vote for the theoretically predicted optimal group size. Approximately
60% of the votes are socially optimal for c = {1,55}, and approximately 40% of the votes
are socially optimal for c =2 0 .
For each cost parameter, we test whether one can reject the null hypothesis that the
11We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of grsize2 is signiﬁcantly smaller than the coeﬃcient of
grsize3, and the coeﬃcient of grsize3 is signiﬁcantly smaller than the coeﬃcient of grsize6
(p-values = 0). We ﬁnd the same result for cost parameters as well.
12Note that the variable round takes values 1,2,...,5.
13For robustness checks, we have also conducted ﬁxed-eﬀect regressions both at the indi-
vidual and at the session levels. Group size aﬀects investment negatively for all cost levels. In
addition, round seems to have a small but signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect for cost levels greater
than 1. Results are available upon request.
18Table 6: Percentage of Votes in Part V 
Group size  c = 1  c = 20  c = 55  c = 100 
1  8  12.7  7.3  22 
2  16  39.3  57.3  24.7 
3  16.7  39.3  11.3  33.3 
6  59.3  8.7  24  20 

proportion of votes is 25% for each group size. For c = {1,20,55}, one can strongly reject
this null hypothesis (chi-square goodness of ﬁt test, p-values = 0.00). For c = 100, one
cannot reject that the proportion of votes is 25% for each group size (p-value = 0.10).
More important, the highest percentage of votes is for the socially optimal group sizes. In
particular, for c = 1, group size 6 received the highest number of votes; for c = 20, group
sizes 2 and 3 received the highest number of votes; and for c = 55, group size 2 received
the highest number of votes (proportion tests, p-values = 0.00). For c = 100, group size
3 received signiﬁcantly more votes than the socially optimal level of one (proportion test,
p-value = 0.049).
Result 4: For c = {1,20,55}, the highest proportion of votes is received by the corresponding
socially optimal group sizes. (This holds weakly for c =2 0 .)
Result 4 shows that participants choose to form output-sharing groups for all cost levels.
In addition, we conduct a multinomial logit regression analysis to test whether votes are
aﬀected by cost, previous earnings and experience.14 We construct a new variable, bestgroup,
which takes value 1, 2, 3 if a subject earned the most money in Parts I–IV when the group
size is 1, 2, 3, respectively, and takes value 4 if a subject earned the most money when
the group size is 6.15 Regressors are jointly signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (Wald chi-square =
14Since utilities from diﬀerent group sizes do not need to be ordered, a multinomial logit
regression analysis is more suitable than an ordered logit regression analysis. In addition,
we have performed OLS regressions, and qualitative results did not change.
15The earnings in each part are calculated by adding up each payoﬀ from the 5 corre-
1974.93, p-value = 0.00). In addition, we ﬁnd that both cost and bestgroup signiﬁcantly aﬀect
votes (Wald tests, p-value = 0.03 and p-value = 0.00 respectively). However, coeﬃcient
estimates of round are not jointly statistically signiﬁcant (p-value = 0.40). Table 7 presents
the marginal eﬀects after a multinomial logit regression. Robust standard errors are provided
in parentheses.










  Dependent variable = vote 
VARIABLES  Group size = 1  Group size = 2  Group size = 3  Group size = 6 
        
cost  0.001  –0.000  0.001  –0.002* 
 ( 0 . 0 0 1 )   ( 0 . 0 0 1 )   ( 0 . 0 0 1 )   ( 0 . 0 0 1 )  
bestgroup  –0.037  –0.266**  0.059  0.245** 
 ( 0 . 0 3 4 )   ( 0 . 0 5 2 )   ( 0 . 0 3 6 )   ( 0 . 0 3 2 )  
round  0.007  0.005  –0.023  0.011 
 ( 0 . 0 1 1 )   ( 0 . 0 1 2 )   ( 0 . 0 1 3 )   ( 0 . 0 1 7 )  
        
Observations  600  600  600  600 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
We see that the probability of voting for group size 6 signiﬁcantly decreases with cost
and increases with bestgroup, whereas the probability of voting for group size 2 decreases
with bestgroup.16 These ﬁndings are consistent with the theoretical predictions. A simple
correlation analysis also conﬁrms that votes are negatively correlated with cost (–0.21) and
positively correlated with bestgroup (0.46).
Result 5: Votes are aﬀected by both the cost parameter and the previous earnings at diﬀerent
group sizes. Votes do not change signiﬁcantly as subjects get more experienced with voting.
Table 8 presents the voting outcomes, mean investment decisions and payoﬀs conditional
sponding rounds.
16Since bestgroup is a discrete variable, we have also looked at the predicted probabilities
for each group size under each possible value of bestgroup. We have observed similar results.
20Table 8: Mean Investment and Payoﬀ Conditional on Chosen Group Size
c  Group 
size 
Frequency 
(out of 25) 







   P r e d i c t e d   O b s e r v e d   P r e d i c t e d   O b s e r v e d  
1  2  5.69  5.75 
(0.62) 
168  158 
(21.45) 
2  2  4.95  4.67 
(1.23) 
256  278 
(53.76) 
3  1  4.38  4.50 
(1.22) 
302  294 
(58.43) 
6  20  3.23  3.26 
(1.71) 









   P r e d i c t e d   O b s e r v e d   P r e d i c t e d   O b s e r v e d  
1  3  5.14  4.89 
(1.49) 
252  266 
(102.95) 
2  12  4.00  3.74 
(1.65) 
360  369 
(86.64) 
3  10  3.11  3.00 
(1.28) 
390  383 
(48.70) 









   P r e d i c t e d   O b s e r v e d   P r e d i c t e d   O b s e r v e d  
1  0  4.14  – 416  – 
 
2  18  2.25  2.20 
(1.37) 
504  498 
(88.20) 
3  1  0.78  0.83 
(0.98) 
425  430 
(57.47) 
6  6  0  1.11 
(1.69) 










   P r e d i c t e d   O b s e r v e d   P r e d i c t e d   O b s e r v e d  
1  7  2.86  2.67 
(1.51) 
641  648 
(39.62) 
2  6  0  1.00 
(1.39) 
600  659 
(111.82) 
3  11  0  0.85 
(1.18) 
600  661 
(105.97) 
6  1  0  0.50 
(0.83) 
600  643 
(83.67) 

21on the chosen group size.17 As in the exogenous groups, we see that participants choose
investment levels that are consistent with the theoretical predictions at the socially optimal
group sizes (all p-values are greater than 0.27).18 Moreover, qualitative results are similar
to the case when groups are exogenously imposed: investment decreases with the group size
(p-value = 0.00) and cost (p-value = 0.00). Regression results are available from the authors.
Result 6: Mean investment levels in Part V are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than theoretically
predicted levels at the socially optimal group sizes. In addition, investments are consistent
with the (qualitative) theoretical predictions. Investment decreases with group size and cost.
Finally, we compare the eﬃciency of endogenous group formation with the case of ex-
ogenous groups. Eﬃciency of each part is deﬁned by the observed average payoﬀ divided
by socially optimal payoﬀ. In Table 9, we provide the eﬃciency levels in all parts for each
cost treatment. As expected, eﬃciency levels are quite large. Endogenous group formation
increases eﬃciency compared with the case of no output sharing for all cost levels. In par-
ticular, eﬃciency loss decreased by 50% for cost = 100 and by 68% to 71% for the other cost
levels.
Table 9: A Comparison of Eﬃciency Levels


 G r o u p   s i z e   c   =   1   c   =   2 0   c   =   5 5   c   =   1 0 0  
Exogenous  1  0.72  0.76  0.84  0.92 
2  0.85  0.95  0.98  0.98 
3  0.93  0.97  0.92  0.98 
6  0.96  0.87  0.88  0.96 
Endogenous  voting  0.91  0.93  0.95  0.96 

17Since ties are broken randomly, even though there are equal number of votes for group
sizes 2 and 3 when cost is 20, group size 2 won the voting more frequently than group size 3.
18We focus on the socially optimal group size, since votes are more often for the optimal
group size. Therefore, there are not too much data available on the other group sizes. In
fact, there are too few data points for many of the nonoptimal group sizes, which makes
statistical testing not very meaningful.
225 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we ﬁnd that output sharing attenuates the common-property problem inde-
pendent of the opportunity cost of investing in the common-pool resource. Consistent with
theoretical predictions, we ﬁnd a negative relationship between the aggregate investment
levels (the counterpart to ﬁshing eﬀort) and group size. For a given group size, we show
that aggregate investment in a common-pool resource decreases as the opportunity cost of
investing in it increases. More importantly, we show that socially optimal group sizes are
the most common outcome of the endogenous group formation stage under most of the cost
parameters.
Regarding the point predictions, we ﬁnd that partnership solution (exogenous implemen-
tation of socially optimal group size) generates theoretically predicted levels of investment.
However, in general, theory does not predict the magnitudes very well for the nonoptimal
group sizes. For any deviations from equilibrium predictions, we see that investments shift
toward the eﬃcient outcome.19 One explanation for this is that individuals are altruistic.
If individuals care not only for themselves but also for others, then one would expect to
see higher levels of eﬃciency than a theory predicated on the assumption of self-interested
behavior would predict (except when the theory predicts socially optimal outcomes). This is
highly consistent with our experimental data. Moreover, this type of behavior has been com-
monly observed in other experimental studies on common-pool resources and public goods
(see Ostrom et al. 1994; Ledyard 1995).
Future research should address the stability of the partnership mechanism and its sensi-
tivity to inter subject communication. By stability, we mean migrations of subjects among
existing groups or from an existing group to a newly formed group.20 The eﬀect of inter-
19We focus on the exogenous groups since there are very few data points for statistical
testing for endogenous groups at the nonoptimal group sizes.
20After the voting stage but before the investment stage, a migration stage could be
23subject communication on the Partnership Solution is the subject of a recent study by
Buckley et al. (2009, 2010). They ﬁnd that when individuals within the same output-
sharing group are able to communicate, free riding decreases. It is unclear from their work
whether similar results would occur if subjects collectively chose their group size; moreover,
communication may aﬀect the choice of group size itself. We leave the investigation of such
interplay between communication and endogeneity to future research.
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